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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Alfred Brown Company seeks affirmance of the judg. 
ment below. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties are referred to as they appeared in the 
court below. All italics in this brief have been added. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant in his brief has failed to state clearly 
and completely the undisputed facts. 
This action for personal injuries arose out of an acci· 
dent that occurred June 25, 1969, during the construction 
of a high rise resident hall at Brigham Young University. 
The defendant, a general contractor, was awarded a 
contract with Brigham Young University for the con· 
struction of "Deseret Towers Resident Hall V." There· 
after the defendant entered into a subcontract on Decem· 
her 30, 1968, with Ashton Construction Company for the 
masonry work. The plaintiff, age 49, was employed by 
Ashton Construction as a mason on the above job. He had 
worked as a mason since 1951 and for Ashton Construe· 
tion since 1962 (Plaintiff's deposition at 4). 
He was the first bricklayer on the job. Id at 7. 
Once the exterior walls of the resident hall were 
completed the plaintiff began constructing interior par· 
tition walls on each floor of the building. 
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On the morning of June 25, 1969 the plaintiff work-
ed on the west end of the sixth floor until about 10:00 
a.m. Id. at 24. 
He then went to the east end of the sixth floor and 
began work on another interior partition wall. To com-
plete the upper portion of the wall he used a 2 1/2 foot 
high scaffolding parallel to and placed on the west side of 
the interior partition wall. Id. at 28. The east side of the 
wall was part of the interior of a dormitory room oppo-
site which was an opening in the building's east exterior 
wall in which a window was eventually to be placed. Id. 
at 26. The window space was approximately 8 feet from 
the north end of the scaffolding which extended through 
the door space into the room. See diagram on page 4. 
As the plaintiff completed the wall he picked up his 
tools and jumped backwards off the scaffolding in the 
direction of the window opening. His foot struck some-
thing and rolled with him. Id. at 29. 
In an effort to regain his balance he backpedaled 
some 8 to 1 O feet and fell out the window to the ground 
approximately 60 feet below. Id. at 39. 
The plaintiff, starting at line 23, page 29, of his 
deposition, described the accident: 
"Q. You got the wall clear up to the ceiling when 
the accident happened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had laid the last block then? 
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Plaintiff jumped off here, 
backpedaled and fell out 
here 
A. I had laid the last block. The last block you 
lay, we had to split. We had to split it with 
a saw and lay it in two pieces because of a 
conduit that goes into the ceiling. We had no 
way of getting the last block in without split-
ting the block. I had stepped down once off 
the scaffold and I had looked up and seen 
that the block, the last block that I laid, was 
not in the proper position. So I stepped back 
onto the scaffold and reset the block, and then 
I stepped off the scaffold. I was going to 
restrike, refinish the east side of the wall. I 
had just stepped off the scaffold and stepped 
on something that rolled with me. That is 
when I went backpeddling out of the win-
dow. 
Q. You stepped off the scaffold? Did you step 
off an end or did you step off on the side? 











Stepped off the north end of it? 
The north end through the doorway. 
As you stepped off, did you step off back-
ward or forward? 
Backward. 
I gather you weren't looking at the floor as 
you stepped off? 
I was not looking at the floor. 
You were looking up to see if the block that 
you split was in the proper alignment at the 
time you stepped off? 
Not at the time I stepped off. 
I see. 
No, I was just stepping off. I was stepping 
off preparatory to strike the east - restriking 
the east side of the wall. 
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Q. How far down did you have to step now from 
the scaffold to the floor? 
A. Approximately two and a half feet. 
Q. And you say you stepped on something that 
rolled? Which foot hit this object? The left 
or your right? 
A. That would be - I couldn't answer that 
question. 
Q. And you say when you stepped on this you 
started to kind of backpeddling? 












Did you fall down in anyway before you 
went through the window, or do you know? 
No, I did not fall down. I was trying to catch 
myself. 
How far was it from the point where you 
stepped down in feet to where this window 
opening was? 
Approximately eight feet. 
Was this window open here the same as on 
the floors below? 
The same thing. 
Had you requested at any time from your em· 
ployer that there be any barricade on the win· 
dows prior to working on these interior walls? 
No. 
You had observed on the second floor that 
there was no barricade on the window when 
you put that one up? 
There was no barricade on any window on 
any floor. 
And you made no complaint about the ab· 
sence of a barricade at any time? 
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A. I had made no complaint. I didn't think that 
was my job. 
Q. Well, you had observed the window, 
[through], the aperture there at the time you 
were working, had you not? 
A. I was aware of the openings. I am not deny-
ing that." 
On page 42, line 8, Mr. Smith further describes how 
the accident occurred. 
" Q. Now this round object that you were back-
peddling on before you went out of the win-
dow, did you ever find that? 
A. I never looked for it. 
Q. What is your judgment as to what type of a 
piece of material this was? 
A. It could have been a piece of two by four. It 
could have been a fragment of block. It could 
have been a fragment of brick. It could have 
been a piece of conduit. 
Q. As far as you know it's just as possible one 
as the other? 





Before working in this area you didn't ask 
your employer to have the floor swept or 
cleaned by any of the hod carriers? 
The floors were pretty well cleaned. 
From the time you started work until the time 
you fell you were the only person working 
right in this spot? 
That is true." 
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The defendant moved for summary judgment upon 
the ground there was no genuine issue of fact (R. 64). In 
oral argument and in a written memorandum to the lower 
court defendant argued that summary judgment should 
be granted because the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law which proximately 
caused the injuries of which he complained. The lower 
court and plaintiff's counsel were told all reasonable men 
would argue plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence because he was aware of the window opening when 
he jumped backward off the scaffold, he knew the win-
dow opening was only 8 feet to his rear and he admitted 
stepping backward from the height of 2 1/2 feet, almost 
half his own height, without looking at the floor know-
ing there was debris upon it (Deposition at 14, 29). 
After the first hearing on September 25, 1970, the 
lower court took the motion under advisement, asked 
counsel to submit briefs, and told counsel that if it was 
inclined to grant the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment it would set the case for further oral argument 
(R. 81). The lower court in accordance with this state-
ment, on January 8, 1971, set the matter for further argu-
ment on the issues of causation and workmen's compen-
sation (R. 75, 76). 
Summary judgment was thereafter entered in favor 
of the defendant on January 19, 1971 (R. 78). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
If there is no genuine issue of fact and all reasonable 
men would agree the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law. 
Since the plaintiff knew of the window opening be-
hind him, knew it was 2 1/2 feet from his scaffold to the 
floor and knew there was some debris in the area beneath 
his scaffold, and was confronted with no situation pre-
venting his looking before jumping or jumping forward, 
the defendant submits that in jumping off the scaffold 
with his back to the window opening without at least first 
looking at the floor the plaintiff was negligent as a matter 
of law. 
The case of Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 60 Utah 
2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964) is right on point. In Whit-
man the plaintiff, a truck driver, made a delivery of mer-
chandise to the upper floor of the defendant's store and 
was then directed to the downstairs and out the door. 
Without looking he walked through a set of double doors 
and stepped backwards into an elevator shaft. In affirm-
ing summary judgment for the defendant this court set 
forth the principles governing such cases: 
"The plaintiff is confronted with a basic 
proposition that when there is a hazard which is 
plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged with the 
duty of seeing and avoiding it. And if he fails to 
do so, it is concluded that he was negligent either 
in failing to look, or in failing to heed what he 
saw." 395 P.2d at 920 
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The court also explained upon what conditions a 
jury question will be found to exist in such cases: 
"In order to justify holding that a jury ques-
tion as to negligence exists, where injury has re-
sulted from an observable hazard, it is essential 
that there be something which could be regarded 
as tending to distract the plaintiff's attention or to 
prevent him from seeing the danger, thus provid-
ing some reasonable basis for a finding that even 
though he exercised due care he could be excused 
from seeing and avoiding it." Id. 
In Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P.2d 874 
(1951), a customer went to a garage and fell into a grease 
pit while he was looking up at some tires. He sought to 
excuse his failure to observe the danger by stating he was 
not looking. In affirming a directed verdict for the de-
fendant this court said: 
"Plaintiff seeks to justify his failure to ob-
serve the danger which was clearly visible because 
his sole interest was in the tire on the rack; that 
he didn't see the ladder or the pit because he wasn't 
looking at the floor or wasn't watching where he 
was stepping because his interest was centered 
solely on the tire rack; and that if he was looking 
he would probably have seen the protruding ladder 
and pit. It thus becomes apparent that this is not 
a case where plaintiff used reasonable care for his 
own safety. A reasonable person makes some oh· 
servations along the path he chooses to follow. In 
this instance plaintiff was so intent on observing 
the articles on the rack that he neglected to use the 
care required of a prudent man traversing a shop 
having hazards readily discernible, even to one 
with impaired vision." 229 P.2d at 877 
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In Wood v. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 279, 333 P.2d 630 
(1959), the plaintiff entered a dark garage and proceed-
ed along the right side of a car where she could not see. 
She then turned and fell down a darkened stairwell. She 
knew about the stairwell but stated that she had tempor-
arily forgotten about it because she was preoccupied with 
her granddaughter's wedding plans. In affirming the 
lower court's directed verdict for the defendant this court 
restated the finding that the plaintiff was negligent as a 
matter of law for entering "heedlessly into the darkness 
in an unknown area." 333 P.2d at 632 
In Seo/field v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 1 Utah 2d 218, 205 
P.2d 396 (1953), the plaintiff, a candy salesman, called 
upon the manager of the defendant's store in Elko, Nev-
ada. The manager's officer was located on a platform in 
the rear of the office. After having a conversation with the 
manager plaintiff decided to go to his car and get his sam-
ples. Without looking, he reached for a nonexistent ban-
nister, lost his balance, and fell over the side of the stair-
way. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant 
this court said: 
"The present case presents an even more ob-
vious situation for contributory negligence than in 
the Knox case, for it does not require that we at-
tribute to plaintiff knowledge of the particular 
type of place. He had ample opportunity to ob-
serve and, as a reasonably prudent man, should 
have looked to locate the handrail before he at-
tempted to put his weight on it. The light was 
sufficient, he knew that he was on a platform, and 
althouv.h he may have been preoccupied with try-
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ing to make a sale, he must be held to take the 
simple precaution of a quick glance to assure him-
self of safety as would a reasonably prudent man." 
265 P.2d at 398. 
See also Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 
259 P.2d 297 (1953); Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc., 11 
Utah 2d 138, 355 P.2d 973 (1960); Tempest v. Richard-
son, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 P.2d 124 (1956). 
By plaintiff's own admissions he was well aware of 
the window opening on the sixth floor. He had worked 
on all six floors and had often worked at heights present-
ing an element of danger. He admitted jumping back-
ward off a scaffold almost half his height without first 
taking even a precautionary glance to the floor to see if it 
was safe to jump. Nothing necessitated he jump before 
looking much less jump backwards. Indeed he chose to 
jump from the scaffold in the only place where a potential 
danger of which he was well aware existed. 
POINT II. THE CONDUCT OF LEON C. SMITH 
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCI-
DENT. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges defendant was negligent 
in only one particular: "defendant negligently and care-
lessly failed to cover a wall opening where the plaintiff 
was working . . . (R. 3, paragraph 4)." 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that de-
fendant was negligent in the manner alleged, plaintiff's 
conduct was still the sole proximate cause of his injuries. 
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This court has many times explained the importance 
in distinguishing the stage from the actors. Probably the 
leading case in this state on sole proximate cause is Hill-
yard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 
287 (1953): 
"In applying the test of foreseeability to situ-
ations where a negligently created pre-existing 
condition combines with a later act of negligence 
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-
cut distinction between two classes of cases. The 
first situation is where one has negligently created 
a dangerous condition . . . and a later actor ob-
served, or circumstances are such that he could 
not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid 
it. 
* * * 
"In regard to the first situation it is held as a 
matter of law that the later intervening act does 
interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut 
off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial 
actor." 263 P.2d at 292. 
In a later case, Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 (1961) this court applied 
the Hillyard rules and held a bus driver who had observed 
a negligently parked truck ahead of him to be the sole 
proximate cause of a subsequent collision with the truck. 
The court restated the test of proximate cause: 
"[T]his is the test to be applied: did the 
wrongful act, in a natural and continuous sequence 
of events which might reasonably be expected to 
follow, produce the injury. If so, it ca~ ~e said to 
be a concurring proximate cause of the tnjuty even 
though the later negligent act of another . . . co-
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operated to cause it. On the other hand, if the lat-
ter's act of negligence in causing the collision was 
of such character as not reasonably to be expected 
to happen in the natural sequence of events, then 
such later act of negligence is the independent, in-
tervening cause and therefore the sole proximate 
cause of the injury." 366 P.2d at 992 
In Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co., 12 Utah 2d 
278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), the court held the negligence 
of a construction company employer in continuing work 
in the vicinity of high tension wires without taking steps 
to have them de-energized was the sole proximate cause 
of the deceased's death from electrocution when a crane 
came into contact with a wire. The evidence showed that 
the construction company knew of the hazard four days 
prior to the accident. This court said, after examining the 
facts, that because the construction company knew of the 
hot wire involved, its later negligence was an independ-
ent intervening act of negligence and the sole proximate 
cause of the accident in question. 
This same principle of the foregoing cases has been 
applied in more recent decisions of this court. See for ex-
ample, Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Co., 24 Utah 2d 
128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970) involving a collision between a 
car and a cement truck chute, and Skollingsberg v. Brook-
over, 484 P.2d 1177 (Utah 1971), where plaintiff 
was not allowed to recover for injuries to his leg in a 
second fall subsequent to defendant's negligence which 
caused the initial leg injury. 
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Applying the foregoing principles to this situation it 
is very clear that plaintiff's conduct was the sole proxi-
mate cause of his injuries: 
Mr. Smith knew the window was to his rear; he knew 
that certain debris was always on the floor at construction 
sites, yet he still jumped backwards off a 2 1/2 foot scaf-
fold in the direction of the window opening without mak-
ing any advance check on his footing below. 
There was nothing natural or continuous about the 
absence of a covering over the window space that pro-
duced Mr. Smith's injury. 
POINT III. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IS 
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act encompasses two 
main objectives. The first is to assure that injured em-
ployees will have necessary medical and hospital care and 
modest but certain compensation for their injuries with 
resulting benefits to themselves and their families. The 
second objective is to afford employees protection against 
possible disastrous claims for injuries which otherwise 
they may not be able to bear. 
The definition of employer in the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act is broad. It is designed to provide 
workmen's compensation coverage to persons besides 
those regularly on an employer's payroll. The definition 
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of employer is found in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (1953). 
As far as the section is material it reads: 
"Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and such work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, such contractor, and all 
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any such 
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the mean-
ing of this section, employees of such original 
employer. Any person, firm or corporation engag· 
ed in the performance of work as an independent 
contractor shall be deemed an employer within the 
meaning of this section. The term "independent 
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any 
person, association or corporation engaged in the 
performance of any work for another, who, while 
so engaged, is independent of the employer in all 
that pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is 
engaged only in the performance of a definite job 
or piece of work, and is subordinate to the em-
ployer only in effecting a result in accordance with 
the employer's design." 
Paragraph 7 of plaintiff's complaint (R. 4) alleges: 
"At the time of the plaintiff's injury, the de· 
fondant had exclusive control and management of 
the facilities where the plaintiff was working." 
The subcontract agreement between defendant and 
Ashton Construction Company required the latter to pro-
vide workmen's compensation insurance with the cost of 
such insurance to be included in the $102,600 subcontract. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-60 (1953) provides that work-
men's compensation is an employee's exclusive remedy. 
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In this situation the defendant and Ashton Construc-
tion Company were cooperating on a single project. 
Allowing the plaintiff to recover against this defend-
ant in effect requires the defendant to pay twice for the 
same injury: once under the workmen's compensation 
coverage for which he has paid and the second time in a 
civil action. As such, an employee injured under the cir-
cumstances secures the full benefits of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act while not being bound by any of the 
provisions which would reduce his recovery. One of the 
major purposes of the Act therefore - to protect an em-
ployer from distrastrous claims - is thwarted. 
In the recent case of Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 
2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968), Gibbons and Reed Company 
had on its payroll as a truck driver, the plaintiff. The 
company also hired the defendant Stringham and his 
truck at a rate of $10 per hour. Stringham paid all the 
expenses on his truck and was not listed on Gibbons and 
Reed's payroll. Stringham took orders from Gibbons and 
Reed's foreman as to when to speed his trips and when to 
haul back up to the traxcavator and when to drive away. 
He was not free to haul dirt in any manner other than 
as he was told. On those facts this court held as a matter 
of law Stringham was in the same employment as Gallegos 
even though not on the payroll and workmen's compensa-
tion thus was held to be plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
In Whitaker v. Douglas, 179 Kan. 64, 292 P.2d 688 
( 1956), an action was brought by a subcontractor's em-
ployee against a general contractor for injuries sustained 
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when the employee was delivering a truckload of ready 
mixed concrete. A ramp constructed by the general con-
tractor collapsed causing the truck to upset. The Kansas 
Workmen's Compensation Act is similar to Utah's and 
provided where the work subcontracted was part of the 
contractor's trade and business that workmen's compensa-
tion was the exclusive remedy. The court, in pointing 
out to the plaintiff that workmen's compensation was his 
exclusive remedy, stated that the transporting of the ce-
ment for the construction of the building was part of the 
trade and business of the general contractor and that, al-
though the wages for the driver were paid by Victory 
Sand & Gravel Company, he was helping in construction 
of work to the same extent as if he had been on the direct 
payroll of a general contractor. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Plaintiff is 5 feet 7 inches tall. In jumping back-
wards off the scaffolding (almost half his height) without 
taking even the slightest glance at his footing below he 
was negligent as a matter of law. 
The window opening through which plaintiff fell 
was a condition of which plaintiff was well aware. His 
negligence in intentionally jumping backwards towards 
that opening was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. 
If there was any negligence on the part of defendant in 
not covering that opening it constituted a condition and 
not a cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
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Plaintiff is further barred by the workmen's compen-
sation law from suing this defendant. This defendant has 
already paid for the workmen's compensation coverage 
providing benefits for plaintiff's accident. Allowing an 
additional suit would require this defendant to pay twice 
for the same injury in contravention to the expressed pub-
lic policy of the workmen's compensation laws. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Raymond M. Berry of 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor Continental Bank 
Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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